Overconfidence and bubbles in experimental asset markets by Michailova, Julija & Schmidt, Ulrich
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Overconfidence and bubbles in
experimental asset markets
Julija Michailova and Ulrich Schmidt
Helmut Schmidt University, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
September 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63823/
MPRA Paper No. 63823, posted 25. April 2015 13:13 UTC
 1 
Overconfidence and Bubbles in Experimental  
Asset Markets 
 
Forthcoming in “Journal of Behavioral Finance” 
 
Julija Michailova 
Department of Economics, Helmut Schmidt University 
22043 Hamburg, Germany 
E-mail: julija_michailova@yahoo.com 
 
 
Ulrich Schmidt 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
24100 Kiel, Germany 
E-mail: uschmidt@bwl.uni-kiel.de 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between market overconfidence and 
occurrence of stock-price bubbles. Sixty participants traded stocks in ten 
experimental asset markets. Markets were constructed on the basis of 
subjects’ overconfidence: The most overconfident subjects form high 
overconfidence markets, and the least overconfident subjects low 
overconfidence markets. Prices in low overconfidence markets tend to track the 
fundamental asset value more accurately than prices in high overconfidence 
markets and are significantly lower and less volatile. Additionally we observe 
significantly higher bubble measures and trading volume in high 
overconfidence markets. Two possible explanations for these differences are 
analyzed: While price expectations are significantly higher in high 
overconfidence markets no differences in the average degree of risk aversion 
were detected. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (SSW [1988]) the occurrence of 
speculative bubbles in experimental asset markets with declining fundamental value is a well-
established phenomenon. Several modifications of the design were investigated in order to 
detect possible causes for the emergence of bubbles and to control their size (cf. Porter and 
Smith [2003]). Though it has been recently shown that declining fundamental value of assets 
contributes to the emergence of bubbles (Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl [2012]) behavioral 
characteristics of participants may also play a role. Up to date the only personal characteristic, 
which was found to influence the size of the bubbles in the setting of SSW [1988] was 
individual experience with the experiment (e.g. SSW [1988], Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and 
Moore [2005]). In the present paper we study the impact of another personal characteristic, 
namely overconfidence, on bubble formation in asset markets based on the SSW [1988] design. 
While overconfidence has a documented impact on trading behavior in experimental asset 
markets (Kirchler and Maciejovsky [2002], Biais et al. [2005], Deaves et al. [2009]), its 
relation to the occurrence of bubbles has not yet been addressed directly.  
In the financial literature several effects are summarized under the concept of overconfidence: 
miscalibration, the better than average effect and illusion of control. Moore and Healy [2008] 
refer to these effects subsequently as to overprecision, overplacement and overestimation. 
Miscalibration (overprecision) is a cognitive bias that rests on the fact that people tend to 
overestimate the precision of their knowledge (cf. Lichtenstein et al. [1982]). Inclination of 
people to exaggerate their talents embodies itself in the better than average effect or 
overplacement (cf. Taylor and Brown [1988]). Illusion of control is linked to the exaggeration 
of the degree to which one can control one’s fate (cf. Langer [1975]). It can also be defined as 
optimistic overconfidence - overestimation of the probabilities of the events that are 
advantageous to the subject (cf. Griffin and Brenner [2004]). The concept of overestimation 
of Moore and Healy [2008] includes not only Langer’s illusion of control, but also 
overestimation of one’s actual ability and performance. In this paper we assess 
overconfidence as miscalibration (overprecision). However, according to Moore and Healy 
[2008], the item-confidence paradigm, used to assess overconfidence, measures both 
overprecision and overestimation.  
In this paper we report results of an experiment, designed to investigate the role of average 
overconfidence of subjects, comprising an experimental market (thereafter referred as market 
overconfidence) for the occurrence of stock-price bubbles and the emergence of other stylized 
facts like excessive trade volume and excessive price volatility. For this purpose we extend the 
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basic design of SSW [1988] by a new feature, in which markets are composed on the basis of 
subjects’ overconfidence, assessed in overconfidence measurement sessions. From these 
sessions we invited (i) subjects with lowest overconfidence scores and assigned them to one 
type of markets (referred to as low overconfidence markets in the sequel) and (ii) subjects with 
highest overconfidence scores who were assigned to a second type of markets (called high 
overconfidence markets). Within one market all subjects receive identical information so 
heterogeneity as e.g. in the model of Scheinkman and Xiong [2003] cannot account for bubbles 
in our study. 
Main findings from our experiment can be summarized as follows. Consistent with theoretical 
analyses
1
 (De Bondt and Thaler [1985], Shiller [2000], Benos [1998], Caballé and Sákovics 
[2003]), higher market overconfidence is accompanied by higher average market prices, 
higher volatility, larger deviations of prices from fundamental value, and higher trading 
volume. Prices in low overconfidence markets tend to track fundamental asset value more 
accurately than prices in high overconfidence markets, and are significantly lower. Moreover, 
bubble and crash patterns were observed in the aggregate prices in high overconfidence 
markets, whereas in low overconfidence markets no sudden drop of the aggregate market 
price to the fundamental value occurred.  
We analyze two possible reasons why overconfidence has such a strong impact on our market 
outcomes. First, average degree of risk aversion might be lower in high overconfidence 
markets which would provide a direct rationale for higher asset prices as lower degrees of risk 
aversion imply higher certainty equivalents of risky assets. Second, more overconfident 
subjects may overestimate future prices and the probability to sell assets with profit in later 
rounds. The integration of a simple price forecasting task in the main experiment and a post-
experimental assessment of risk attitudes reveal that more overconfident subjects indeed 
expect substantially higher prices whereas no significant difference of risk attitudes was 
observed.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the design of our study consisting 
of overconfidence measurement, the experimental asset markets, and a post-experimental 
assessment of risk attitudes. Section 3 presents our experimental results and section 4 contains 
some concluding observations. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 For a review on overconfidence in theoretical finance please refer to Glaser, Nöth, and Weber [2004]. 
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2 Experimental Design 
2.1 Overconfidence Measurement 
To measure individual overconfidence a specially developed instrument was used
2
. This 
instrument is a general knowledge test, consisting of 18 items. Each item has three alternative 
answers, of which only one is correct. Test is balanced with respect to the hard-easy effect
3
 by 
including an equal number of questions of hard, moderate and easy difficulty levels. To avoid 
biases in overconfidence measures due to question content, items are not connected to 
economics or finance and are gender neutral. Instrument possesses good internal consistency 
(reliability): Cronbach’s alpha for test confidence is 0.79 and for the bias score 0.68 (cf. 
Michailova and Katter, [2014]).  
Previous economic experiments mostly assessed overconfidence through confidence interval 
elicitation for questions with the known numerical answers (cf. Russo and Schoemaker, 
[1992]). In contrast, this instrument uses different format, which is clearer to subjects and is 
less prone to overconfidence (cf. Klayman et al., [1999]). Namely, participants had to answer 
our 18 questions and for each question, had to assess how confident they were in the 
correctness of their answer. For this purpose they could use any number in the range from 
33% (complete uncertainty) to 100% (complete certainty). There were no monetary incentives 
for these confidence elicitations. The under- or overconfidence of each participant was 
measured as a bias score (BStest), which was calculated as the difference between the mean 
confidence level across all questions and the mean proportion of correct answers. A positive 
bias score represents overconfidence and a negative bias score represents underconfidence. A 
bias score of zero indicated an accurately calibrated person (confidence-neutral person). 
 
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Where ci is the confidence and ai is the accuracy in answering item i; N is the total number of 
items.  
Overconfidence measurement sessions were performed during several economics lectures at 
the University of Kiel. In each of the chosen classes, students were informed that they had an 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed description of the instrument and procedure of its development please refer to Michailova and 
Katter [forthcoming].  
3
 Hard-easy effect occurs when the degree of overconfidence increases with the increase in the difficulty of the 
questions, where difficulty is measured as the percentage of correct answers (Gigerenzer et al., [1991]). 
 5 
opportunity to take part in the short experiment on the voluntary basis, for which a general 
knowledge test had to be filled out. For this activity 15 minutes were given. Participants in 
each overconfidence measurement session competed for the three prizes of 30, 20 and 10 
EUR, which were awarded to those who answered the most questions right
4
. Before students 
started with the tests, a planned market experiment was advertised. These subjects who were 
eager to take part in the economic experiment were encouraged to mark their interest on the 
tests by ticking the “I’m interested in participation in further experiments” option and leaving 
their e-mail address. Information about the market experiment was presented in such a way 
that subjects could not anticipate the link between it and the general knowledge test. This 
procedure allowed us to obtain a large pool of students with their estimated bias scores and to 
ensure that the two stages of the experiment were perceived by participants as two non-
associated experiments.  
More than 200 students showed interest in the forthcoming economic experiment. A database 
of the interested persons included information on 221 students’ name, age, nationality, subject 
of studies, semester and overconfidence score. Consistent with previous research, subjects in 
the database on average were overconfident (BStest: M = 11.78, SD = 10.58). As explained 
above, we focused in the experiment on the least and the most overconfident subjects, whom 
are further on called low overconfidence and high overconfidence subjects, respectively. 
These students were approached via e-mail and invited to register for the main experiment. It 
is important to mention, that overconfidence measurement was never mentioned to subjects, 
and they knew neither their own degree of overconfidence, nor had they any information 
about overconfidence of other participants. An invitation included a list of scheduled sessions 
from which subjects could choose one and register for participation; however, not known by 
any participant, high overconfidence subjects received a different list of sessions than low 
overconfidence subjects.  
Appendix A presents data on the bias scores of the various experimental subgroups: all 
participants who were in the database and all students who participated in the experimental 
market sessions (a subsample of those in the database). All groups seemed to be substantially 
                                                 
4
 Subjects were not offered reward for the accuracy in probability elicitation (confidence in correctness of an 
answer). A common mechanism used to incentivize probability elicitation is quadratic-scoring rule (QSR). 
Michailova and Katter [forthcoming] present two arguments for not using QSR as a payment procedure in 
overconfidence measurement: First, under QSR subjects who are not risk neutral are inclined to misreport their 
confidence (cf. Winkler and Murphy, [1970]); second, QSR is not easy for the subjects to understand (cf. Read, 
2005). 
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overconfident, except for the participants of the low overconfidence markets. In Appendix A 
we also test several hypotheses of the equality of the average overconfidence of different 
subgroups. Most importantly for the construction of our markets, the bias score of the 
participants of high overconfidence markets (M = 21.33, SD = 8.26) is significantly higher 
than the bias score of the participants of low overconfidence markets (M = 1.06, SD = 4.03). 
Additionally, we were successful in excluding a gender bias, as the mean equality hypothesis 
is failed to be rejected for the difference between overconfidence of male versus female 
subjects both among all students in our database, as well as among all participants of 
experimental asset market.  
 
2.2 Experimental Asset Markets  
For each of our ten market sessions six participants were recruited from the set of subjects 
who participated in overconfidence measurement sessions. None of our subjects participated 
before in a similar experiment. The 60 subjects were comprised of 35 males and 25 females, 
aged 19 to 28 (M = 22.73, SD = 2.06), and 87% were of German nationality. Approximate 
time required to conduct the experiment was one hour. Subjects earned on average 390.36 
ECU (10.54 EUR, SD = 197.89) in the asset market (without the reward for the forecasting 
activity). Men earned on average more ECUs than women, 447 ECU compared to 335 ECU. 
This difference is significant (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.65, p < 0.01, one-sided). Instructions 
familiarized participants with the rules of the experimental market. English translation of 
instructions can be found in Appendix B. 
All experimental sessions were conducted in the computer lab. Six players participated in 
each of the experimental asset markets. Subjects could take part in only one experimental 
session and only in that type of the market (low overconfidence/high overconfidence) to 
which they were appointed based on the results of overconfidence measurement sessions. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher [2007]). 
At the beginning of sessions students were given time to read the detailed instructions and ask 
questions. At the end of the time devoted for reading the instructions, the experimenter read 
out loudly the most important information. Two trial periods followed, during which students 
could familiarize themselves with the experimental software, and again were allowed to ask 
questions if something was unclear to them. Both prior to the trial periods and after them 
subjects were informed that these periods had no impact on their results and payoff. 
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The design of trading rounds followed Smith, Suchanek, and Williams [1988] with slight 
changes in the price forecasting task, and was performed as a continuous anonymous double 
auction. Prior to the start of the experiment each trader was endowed with an equal amount of 
experimental assets and cash: 300 units of experimental currency (ECU) and 3 units of the 
experimental asset. Every experimental market consisted of the sequence of 15 trading 
periods lasting at most 180 seconds during which each trader could post her bid and ask prices 
for asset units. Each participant could purchase asset units by spending an amount of their 
working capital, or sell units of the inventory and thereby increase their working capital. At 
the end of each trading period, each asset in the inventory of the participants paid a dividend 
with possible values of 0.0, 0.8, 2.8, or 6.0 ECU. Probability of each dividend value was 0.25, 
so the expected dividend of each asset amounted to 2.4 ECU in each trading period. As the 
terminal asset value is zero, the fundamental value of an asset, thus, equals n × 2.4 ECUs, 
where n is the number of trading periods remaining until the end of the experiment.  
At the end of trading periods, participants were shown market summary information from the 
past period, and were asked to predict the average market price for the next period as well as 
to state how confident they were that their price forecast was correct. To express their 
confidence subjects could use any value between 0% and 100%. Participants were paid for 
their predictions based on their accuracy. Each period subjects were given feedback on their 
accuracy and their reward for the price forecasting task. Point estimation for the price 
prediction task, as used by e.g. SSW [1988], was chosen over interval estimation due to 
several reasons. First, overconfidence measures obtained through interval estimation by 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky [2002] did not vary in time and remained in the area of 
overconfidence; however, their point-estimate measure varied in time and took values from 
overconfident, to accurately calibrated, and underconfident. Second, this form of price 
prediction task enabled comparison between the two overconfidence measures: the one 
obtained in overconfidence measurement sessions and the other obtained in experimental 
asset market.  
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid in cash the amount of money corresponding 
to their final working capital converted at the predefined exchange rate to Euros. Final 
working capital (FWC) equaled:  
FWC = (300 ECU starting capital) + (dividend earnings) + (stock sales revenue) -                             
(stock purchase cost)             (2) 
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Reward for the accuracy in predicting next period’s average price was constructed to be an 
additional income source in order to encourage conscious engagement in the experiment. The 
closer the prediction was to the actual average market price, the higher was the reward
5
. The 
reward scheme used in the experiment was similar to the suggested by Haruvy, Lahav, and 
Noussair [2007]
6
:  
Level of Accuracy Reward 
Within 95% -105% of actual price 3 ECU 
Within 87.5%-112.5% of actual price 1 ECU 
Within 75%-125% of actual price 0.5 ECU 
As in the overconfidence measurement via general knowledge test, subjects were rewarded 
only for their accuracy in predicting average price but not in the elicited probabilities that 
their forecast was correct. Both monetary reward and the feedback about their predictions’ 
accuracy were used for improving the subjects’ calibration in the price prediction task.  
2.3 Post-experimental Measurement of Risk Attitudes 
A few months after the conclusion of the main experiment we invited 50% of our subjects to 
an additional experiment, measuring risk attitudes with the method of Holt and Laury [2002]. 
From these 32 subjects 16 were high overconfidence and 16 low overconfidence subjects. 
Experimental design involved a choice list (see Table 1) where subjects had to choose in ten 
rows between two lotteries, option A and option B. Option A was a “safe” choice and paid 
either 3EUR or 2.40 EUR; Option B was a “risky” choice and paid either 5.78 EUR or 0.15 
EUR. Subjects were asked to make ten decisions and pick one option in each of the ten rows. 
Options in the ten rows had equal payoffs, however, the probability of the high-payoff 
outcome gradually increased in steps of 10%, until it reached 100% for the tenth decision; 
correspondingly, probability of the low-payoff outcome has gradually decreased in steps of 
10%. As in Holt and Laury [2002] a total number of safe choices was used to assess 
individual risk aversion. At the end of the session one row was determined randomly and each 
subject could play out her choice in this row for real.  
                                                 
5
 We have chosen the size of reward for a forecasting task such that it would not motivate subjects to engage in 
strategic manipulations of the market price, in their desire to maximize their reward for this task. Still we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that it did influence behavior of some participants.  
6
 This incentive scheme instead of a quadratic scoring rule was chosen for the sake of keeping the instructions 
simple (Haruvy et al. [2007]). 
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Table 1: The Choice List 
3 Results 
Average Prices 
In this section various summary statistics of the two types of the market are compared. Each 
session counts as one (independent) observation. Totally ten sessions were conducted, five 
high overconfidence and five low overconfidence markets.  
Figure 1 shows that average prices
7
 in high overconfidence markets are substantially higher 
than in low overconfidence markets. The average market price in low overconfidence markets 
was 33 ECUs (SD = 9.41) and 67 ECUs (SD = 16.02) in high overconfidence markets. This 
difference is significant (Mann-Whitney U = 0.00, p < 0.01, one-sided). The average 
fundamental value (FV) equals 19.20 ECU; depicted by the dotted line in Figure 1. Prices in 
both low overconfidence and high overconfidence markets are significantly higher than FV 
(Wilcoxon T = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
 
                                                 
7
 Average prices per period averaged over 15 periods.  
Option A Option B 
1/10 of 3.00 EUR,   9/10 of 2.40 EUR 1/10 of 5.78 EUR,   9/10 of 0.15 EUR 
2/10 of 3.00 EUR,   8/10 of 2.40 EUR 2/10 of 5.78 EUR,   8/10 of 0.15 EUR 
3/10 of 3.00 EUR,   7/10 of 2.40 EUR 3/10 of 5.78 EUR,   7/10 of 0.15 EUR 
4/10 of 3.00 EUR,   6/10 of 2.40 EUR 4/10 of 5.78 EUR,   6/10 of 0.15 EUR 
5/10 of 3.00 EUR,   5/10 of 2.40 EUR 5/10 of 5.78 EUR,   5/10 of 0.15 EUR 
6/10 of 3.00 EUR,   4/10 of 2.40 EUR 6/10 of 5.78 EUR,   4/10 of 0.15 EUR 
7/10 of 3.00 EUR,   3/10 of 2.40 EUR 7/10 of 5.78 EUR,   3/10 of 0.15 EUR 
8/10 of 3.00 EUR,   2/10 of 2.40 EUR 8/10 of 5.78 EUR,   2/10 of 0.15 EUR 
9/10 of 3.00 EUR,   1/10 of 2.40 EUR 9/10 of 5.78 EUR,   1/10 of 0.15 EUR 
10/10 of 3.00 EUR, 0/10 of 2.40 EUR 10/10 of 5.78 EUR, 0/10 of 0.15 EUR 
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Figure 1: Average asset prices in both types of markets 
Evolution of Average Prices 
Figure 2 presents development of the aggregate average prices in low overconfidence and 
high overconfidence markets in the course of experiment. The dotted line indicates that FV 
diminishes by 2.4 in each of the 15 trading periods. For the graphs depicting average price 
development in each of the experimental markets separately see Appendix C.  
 
 
Figure 2: Development of the aggregate average market price 
Visual data analysis suggests that aggregate prices deviate from FV in both types of the 
markets. However prices in low overconfidence markets deviate from FV to a smaller extent 
than prices in high overconfidence markets and tend to track FV more accurately. It can also 
be seen that in high overconfidence markets bubble and crash pattern is more pronounced 
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than in low overconfidence markets, where no sudden drop of the aggregate market price to 
FV is observed. 
Volatility  
Figure 3 presents volatility in both types of markets, measured in terms standard deviation of 
prices
8
. A Mann-Whitney U test confirms that volatility in the high overconfidence markets is 
significantly higher than in the low overconfidence markets (Mann-Whitney U = 4.00, p < 
0.05, one-sided). For both types of the market, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test enabled rejection 
of the null hypothesis that the volatility of prices was equal to the volatility of FV (SD = 
10.73) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that volatility was higher (Wilcoxon T = 1.89, p < 
0.05, one-sided).  
 
 
Figure 3: Volatility of asset prices in both types of markets 
Trading Activity 
According to the No-Trade Theorem by Milgrom and Stokey [1982] rational agents who 
differ from each other only in terms of information and who have no reason to trade in the 
absence of information will not trade. Figure 4 shows that this result does not hold for our 
experimental markets, even though there was no private information at all in our design. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test of the hypothesis that turnover (calculated as number of assets 
traded in one period divided by the total number of assets, i.e. 18) equals zero is rejected for 
both markets in favor of the alternative hypothesis that turnover is significantly higher than 
zero (Wilcoxon T = 1.90, p < 0.05, one -sided).  
 
                                                 
8
 Standard deviation per period averaged over 15 periods. 
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Figure 4: Average trading activity (turnover) in both types of markets  
Trading activity in low overconfidence markets is lower than in high overconfidence ones: 
average market turnover in low overconfidence sessions is 28% (5 units of the asset) and 44% 
(8 units of the asset) in high overconfidence sessions. This difference is significant (Mann-
Whitney U = 1.50, p < 0.05, one-sided). This result is in line with previous research that 
found overconfidence to be connected to higher trading volume (Odean [1999], Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink [2006], Deaves et al. [2009]).  
Evolution of the joint average market turnover in five low overconfidence and five high 
overconfidence markets is shown in Appendix D. It can be observed that the joint average 
market turnover decreased over the trade periods in both types of markets. Increase in trading 
activity in the last period can be attributed to an end-game effect. 
 
Price Forecasting 
Average forecasts for low overconfidence and high overconfidence markets are shown in 
Figure 5. It is obvious that forecasts in the high overconfidence markets (M = 69.80, SD = 
16.75) are higher than in the low overconfidence markets (M = 32.20, SD = 8.32). According 
to a Mann-Whitney U test this difference is significant (Mann-Whitney U = 0.00, p < 0.01). 
Higher price forecasts in high overconfidence markets are not entirely driven by higher 
realized prices as already in the first period forecasts in high overconfidence markets (M = 
90.20, SD = 40.24) exceed those in low overconfidence markets (M = 51.37, SD = 17.53) 
significantly (Mann-Whitney U = 3.00, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
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Figure 5: Price forecasting in both types of markets 
Market bias score from the price forecasting task (BSforecasting) was calculated for each session 
separately, based on the same methodology as in the general knowledge task. First, for each 
subject, the proportion of correct forecasts across all periods was subtracted from the mean 
confidence level across all periods. Second, individual bias scores were averaged across all 
participants in that market: 
 
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,     (3) 
where M is the number of forecasting periods; N is the number of participants in the market; 
cij is the confidence in forecasting average price in period i of a participant j; aij is the 
accuracy in forecasting average price in period i of a participant j.  
Market overconfidence measure obtained via overconfidence test (BStest) is strongly 
correlated with the overconfidence measure from the forecasting task (Spearman's rho (8) = 
0.65, p < 0.05, one-sided). According to Cohen [1988] this correlation coefficient is 
considered to be large, thus we can assume that both constructs measure the same 
phenomenon. This result also suggests that overconfidence is a robust phenomenon in our 
sample. 
Figure 6 indicates that on average the bias score from the price forecasting task was higher in 
high overconfidence than in low overconfidence markets. On average overconfidence in price 
prediction task differed between the two types of market by 10 units (BSforecasting in low 
overconfidence markets: M = 50.08, SD = 8.96; BSforecasting in high overconfidence markets: 
M = 60.31, SD = 5.02). BSforecasting value in high overconfidence markets is significantly 
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larger than BSforecasting in low overconfidence markets (Mann-Whitney U = 4.00, p < 0.05, 
one-sided). 
 
 
Figure 6: Average overconfidence in both types of markets 
Risk Aversion 
Experimental results present evidence that on average subjects were risk averse with 5.66 
“safe” choices (SD = 1.82). Low overconfidence subjects took on average 5.81 safe choices 
(SD = 1.42), and high overconfidence subjects 5.50 safe choices (SD = 2.19). Statistical tests, 
conducted to check whether more overconfident subjects were also more risk loving, detected 
no significant difference between the two groups of players, neither in terms of their average 
number of “safe” choices (Mann-Whitney Z = 0.320, p = 0.749, two-sided), nor in their 
variation (Siegel-Tukey test Z = 0.47, p = 0.642, two-sided). Correlation coefficient between 
risk aversion, measured as the number of “safe” choices, and individual overconfidence, 
measured as general knowledge test bias score and the bias score from forecasting task, 
implies no linear relationship between them (BStest: Spearman’s Rho(30) = -0.095, p = 0.303, 
one-sided; BSforecasting: Spearman’s Rho(30) = 0.199, p = 0.137, one-sided).  
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 7: Comparisons of BS(2-8) and BS(9-15): a. low overconfidence markets; b. high 
overconfidence markets 
 
Evolution of the Bias Score 
To investigate whether overconfidence is reduced by the end of the game, data of the price 
prediction task were divided into two time intervals of seven periods each, and two 
overconfidence measures for each market were calculated: one score for the first seven 
periods BS(2-8), and the second for the last seven periods BS(9-15). Figure 7 demonstrates 
that for most of the markets overconfidence measures calculated from the data on the price 
prediction for the first seven periods are higher than those calculated from the last seven last 
periods. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test confirms that BS(2-8) is significantly higher than BS(9-
15) (Z = -2.43, p < 0.01, one-sided). This finding could serve as an explanation why bubbles 
mostly burst close to the end of the experiment. 
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Bubble Measures 
From the previous analysis we obtained evidence, that although prices, volatility and turnover 
in low overconfidence (L.O.) markets are significantly below those in high overconfidence 
(H.O.) markets, they are still much higher than initially hypothesized. In other words, low 
overconfidence markets might also be prone to bubbles, but of a smaller magnitude. To 
analyze this issue, we calculate several measures of the magnitude of bubbles that were used 
by previous authors (e.g. Porter and Smith [1995], Noussair and Tucker [2006], Dufwenberg 
et al. [2005], Stöckl et al., [2010]). These measures are: Hassel-R
2
, Price Amplitude (APL), 
Normalized Absolute Deviation (NAD), Normalized (Average) Price Deviation (NPD), 
Velocity, Realtive Absolute Deviation (RAD), and Relative Deviation (RD)
9
. Table 2 reports 
the values of the measures by session and market type.  
All bubble measures calculated for low overconfidence sessions are statistically significantly 
smaller than the ones obtained from high overconfidence sessions (see Appendix E.I). These 
results demonstrate that although bubbles in low overconfidence markets are not completely 
eliminated, they are less severe in comparison to the bubbles in high overconfidence markets. 
Correlation coefficients between bubble measures and the two measures of overconfidence 
(BStest and BSforecating) are large and significant (see Appendix E.II), implying that the size of 
the bubble measures increases with the increase in market overconfidence.
10
 
                                                 
9
 The Hassel-R
2
 (Haessel, 1978) measures goodness-of-fit between average market price per period and 
fundamental asset value. Hassel-R
2
 can take values in the interval [0, 1]; it converges to 1 if trading prices 
converge to fundamental values. The Normalized Price Deviation and the Normalized Absolute Deviation show 
whether stocks were overpriced or underpriced relative to the fundamental value. NPD (NAD) is calculated by 
summing up all (absolute) deviations of market contract prices from fundamental value and dividing this sum by 
the total number of stocks in the market. The Price Amplitude is the maximum value of the shift of average 
contract price from the fundamental value for an experimental session. Higher price amplitudes imply greater 
bubbles, and larger swings in the market price of the asset relative to fundamental value. Velocity of the asset is 
found by dividing the total number of transactions over the experimental session by the total number of stocks in 
the market. This measure is connected to the volume of trade: the higher is the velocity, the higher is the volume 
of trade. Relative Absolute Deviation measures the average level of asset mispricing and Absolute Deviation of 
asset overvaluation in the market 
10
 This is in line with Ackert et al. [2009] who found irrationality (i.e. probability judgment errors) to be 
correlated with magnitude and frequency of price bubbles. 
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Session 
Market 
type 
Hassel-
R
2
 
NPD NAD APL 
Velo-
city 
RAD RD 
1 H.O. 0.58 9.14 9.31 1.69 4.61 0.50 0.50 
2 H.O. 0.54 24.91 24.94 2.25 5.94 0.72 0.72 
3 H.O.  0.41 38.26 38.38 2.87 7.89 0.44 0.43 
4 H.O. 0.29 13.01 13.20 1.32 6.50 0.47 0.46 
5 H.O. 0.89 25.87 25.96 3.33 6.39 0.30 0.30 
6 L.O.  0.94 0.98 1.02 0.30 3.67 0.05 0.05 
7 L.O. 0.91 5.75 6.13 1.09 4.56 0.10 0.09 
8 L.O. 0.57 1.77 3.41 0.67 5.89 0.08 0.06 
9 L.O. 0.94 9.59 9.92 1.67 4.28 0.37 0.36 
10 L.O. 0.81 3.78 4.10 1.15 3.56 0.36 0.34 
Table 2: Bubble Measures in the Single Sessions 
Table 3 presents average values of Normalized Absolute Deviation
11
 and the Amplitude from 
our experimental treatments alongside with the values from the paper of SSW [1988]. On 
average values from the low overconfidence markets treatment lie below values obtained by 
SSW [1988]; thus there is evidence of the smaller deviations from the fundamental value in 
low overconfidence markets. 
 NAD Velocity Amplitude 
High overconfidence markets 2.24 6.27 2.29 
Low overconfidence markets 0.49 4.39 0.98 
Smith, Suchanek, and Williams [1988] 5.68 4.55 1.24 
Table 3: Comparison of Average Bubble Measures 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper results of an experiment, designed to investigate the role of market 
overconfidence for the occurrence of stock-prices bubbles have been reported. The design of 
                                                 
11
 For the comparison of NAD measure from our experiment to those of SSW [1988], it has to be divided by ten. The 
reason is that, their study used an expected dividend value of 0.24 ECU; in our experiment it is 2.40 ECU. 
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the experiment follows Smith, Suchanek and Williams [1988] and is extended by a new 
feature, in which markets are constructed on the basis of subjects’ overconfidence. In the 
experiment two types of markets are constructed: low overconfidence and high 
overconfidence market.  
Our results refine differences between market outcomes in the experimental treatments and 
suggest the existence of the connection between market overconfidence and market outcomes. 
Although all traders in our study have identical information we observe that trading activity in 
low overconfidence markets is significantly above zero; however it is significantly below 
trading activity in the high overconfidence markets. Our results show very clearly that higher 
market overconfidence is accompanied by the higher average market prices and larger 
deviations of the prices from fundamental value. Although average prices in both types of 
markets significantly exceed the fundamental value, prices in low overconfidence markets 
tend to track the fundamental asset value more accurately than prices in high overconfidence 
markets, and are significantly lower. Moreover, bubble and crash patterns were observed in 
the aggregate price in high overconfidence markets, whereas in low overconfidence markets 
no sudden drop of the aggregate market price to the fundamental value occurred. Volatility of 
the prices and trade volume proved to be significantly lower in low overconfidence markets. 
We analyze two possible channels through which overconfidence could be projected onto 
asset prices in our markets. First, more overconfident subjects may be less risk averse and 
value possession of risky assets higher. More overconfident subjects may overestimate future 
prices and the probability to sell assets with profit in later rounds. While we do not detect 
significant differences in the average degree of risk aversion on both markets, high 
overconfidence subjects have substantially higher price forecasts than low overconfidence 
ones, suggesting that the second explanation is the driving force behind high prices in the high 
overconfidence markets. 
Several studies showed that professional investors may be particularly prone to 
overconfidence. For instance Glaser, Langer and Weber [2005, 2007] demonstrated that 
professional traders are more overconfident than students. Menkhoff, Schmeling and Schmidt 
[2010] found investment advisors to be substantially miscalibrated, despite their high degree 
of professionalism. Barber and Odean [2001] suggest that overconfidence motivates mutual 
fund managers to trade excessively. Also, empirical evidence exists that investment activity of 
the firm is correlated with CEO overconfidence (cf. Liu and Taffler [2008], Sautner and 
Weber [2009]). Given these observations, our experimental results may have serious 
implications for financial markets in the real world. 
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APPENDIX A: BIAS SCORES OF THE EXPERIMENTAL SUBGROUPS (in brackets p-values of 
group mean differences) 
 
Database 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
201 All 11.78 10.57 -11.33 43.50 
93 Female 9.62 10.68 -11.33 38.89 
108 Male 13.37 10.28 -10.28 43.50 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
3.75                                                        
(0.57) 
-- -- -- 
Experimental Sessions 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
60 All 11.20 12.08 -5.89 43.50 
25 Female 9.96 12.45 -5.89 38.89 
35 Male 12.08 11.91 -4.72 43.50 
30 
High 
overconfidence 
21.33 8.26 10.17 43.50 
30 
Low 
overconfidence 
1.06 4.03 -5.89 6.78 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
2.13                                                 
(0.81) 
-- -- -- 
 
High ove. vs. low 
ove. diff. 
20.27                                              
(0.00) 
-- -- -- 
High 
ove. 
markets 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
-0.65 
-- -- -- 
(0.64) 
Low 
ove. 
markets 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
0.68                                                
(0.76) 
-- -- -- 
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APPENDIX B: TRANSLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment we are going to create a market in which you will trade units of a fictitious 
asset (i.e. “shares” of a “stock”) that earn a dividend over a series of trading periods. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make appropriate decisions 
YOU MAY EARN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO 
YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment. 
The currency used in the market is called Gulden. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
Guldens. At the end of experiment, the Guldens that you have accumulated will be converted 
to Euros at the exchange rate of 0.27 EUR for each 10 Guldens and you will be paid in Euros. 
Note that the more Guldens you earn, the more Euros you get! 
Duration of the experiment 
The market will take place over a sequence of 15 trading periods. You may think of each 
trading period as a “business or trading day”. Each trading period has a maximum length of 
180 seconds at which time the market will close for that period. The remaining time left in 
each period will be shown by a clock on your computer screen.  
The market period can be ended before the trading time expires by a UNANIMOUS vote of 
all participants in the market to end trading for that period. This alternative stopping rule 
allows the group as a whole to bypass the usual 180 second stopping rule. Each participant 
can vote by pressing the key labeled VOTE. Pressing VOTE and thus voting to end that 
market period does not eliminate you from participating further in trading for that period; it 
simply says that you are ready to end trading in the current period and move on to the next 
period. 
Initial Endowments of Participants 
Each trader at the beginning of the trading game is endowed by STARTING CAPITAL equal 
to 300 Guldens and 3 units of assets. During the experiment you may purchase or sell assets. 
At the END of each trading period you will receive a DIVIDEND on EACH UNIT asset unit 
in your inventory.  
Dividend Process 
You will not know the exact value of your dividend per unit prior to the end of each trading 
period. At the end of each trading period you will be told the value of your dividend per unit 
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and your dividend earnings (dividend earnings = assets × dividend per unit). They will be 
added to your working capital. 
Your dividends are drawn randomly each period. The possible values of your dividend per 
unit and the associated probability of occurrence are given below:  
dividend 0.0 Gulden 0.8 Gulden 2.8 Gulden 6 Gulden 
probability 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 
Thus, the average dividend over many draws is 2.4 Gulden (=0.0*1/4+0.8*1/4+2.8*1/4+6*1/4) 
Before each trading period information on potential income from holding your assets till the end 
of the experiment (15
th
 period) is provided to assist you in formulation of your market 
decisions. The following information is given to you: maximum, average and minimum 
possible dividends (the same in each period), and maximum, average and minimum earnings 
per inventory unit over the remaining experiment periods.  
Reward scheme 
Your decisions regarding the purchase and sale of asset units and your end-of-period 
inventory level (dividend earnings = dividend per unit × end-of-period inventory) should rest 
on the fact that at the end of the experiment your cash earnings are based on your final 
working capital which equals: 
(300 Gulden starting capital) + (dividend earnings) + (asset sales revenue) - (asset purchase 
cost). 
At the end of the game your assets have no value! 
The rules of the Experimental Market 
Suppose we open the market for Trading Period 1 and that you wish to enter your bid or offer. 
To enter bid (price at which you wish to buy an asset): type in the price for which you wish to 
buy an asset. Then click the box labeled “ENTER BID”. To enter offer (price at which you wish 
to sell an asset): type in the price at which you wish to sell your asset and then click on the box 
“ENTER OFFER”.  
Notice that bids are going to be ranked in the decreasing order on the right side of the screen, 
and sale offers in the increasing order on the left-hand side of the screen. 
Suppose now, that you wish to accept Seller’s offer and purchase one unit of the asset. To do 
this first click the appealing price, standing in the column named “SALES OFFERS”, and 
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then click the button labeled “ACCEPT OFFER”. If you wish to accept Buyer’s bid click on 
the appealing price, standing in the column “BIDS” and then click the button labeled 
“ACCEPT BID”. Note that after a contract has been made, all bids and offers are erased and a 
new auction begins.  
Upon buying/selling one unit of the commodity the transaction price (sales or purchase) will 
be added to (if you have sold), or subtracted from (if you have bought) your working capital 
immediately, same is valid for the assets’ inventory.  
Your inventory at the end of a trading period is carried over to the beginning of the next 
trading period. At the end of each trading period your working capital will be increased by the 
amount of your dividend earnings (dividend earnings = number of units in your inventory × 
dividend per unit). 
You can buy asset units as long as your working capital is greater than or equal to the purchase 
price. If you attempt to enter a bid or accept a seller’s offer that is greater than your working 
capital, the action will be ignored and you will receive an error message on your display screen. 
You can sell assets as long as your inventory is greater than zero. If you attempt to enter an 
offer or accept a buyer’s bid, when you have no assets in your inventory, the action will be 
ignored and you will receive an error message on your display screen. 
Market Information 
At the end of each trading period you will have the opportunity to see the market price 
summary information from the past trading periods, which will include such information as 
average market contract price, the highest, and the lowest market price, volume traded and 
dividend for that period.  
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Additional Means to Earn 
At the end of each trading period you will be asked to enter a forecast of the average contract 
price in the next trading period. Information on the current period’s mean price will be 
available for your inspection prior to entering a forecast. Information on your forecasting 
accuracy, consisting of the actual price, and your price forecast from the past periods will be 
available to your inspection after entering a forecast.  
You will be paid for your predictions, based on their accuracy. The closer the prediction is to 
the actual average market price, the higher is the reward. Reward scheme for predictions’ 
accuracy:  
Level of Accuracy  Earnings  
+/- 5% from the actual price  3 Gulden 
+/- 12.5% from the of actual price  1 Gulden  
+/- 25% from the actual price  0,5 Gulden  
Your income from “forecasting part” will be converted to Euros at the same rate as mentioned 
above and paid to you at the conclusion of the experiment. 
In the gap marked “Confidence level” you have to write how confident you are that your price 
forecast is correct! You can use any number between 0% and 100% to express your 
confidence, that your forecast is correct. Thus 0% means that you completely do not believe 
that your forecast can be true, and 100% means that you are completely sure that your 
Forecast will be correct. 
This is the end of the instructions! 
If you have a question that was not fully answered by the instructions please raise your hand and 
ask the experiment monitor before proceeding. 
BEWARE! YOUR EARNINGS MAY SUFFER IF YOU PROCEED INTO THE 
MARKETPLACE WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE INSTRUCTIONS! 
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APPENDIX C: Development of the average market price (a. Low overconfidence markets,    
b. High overconfidence markets; dotted line represents FV) 
 
 
a. 
 
b.
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APPENDIX D: JOINT AVERAGE TURNOVER DEVELOPMENT (a. Low overconfidence markets,                          
b. High overconfidence markets) 
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APPENDIX E 
E.I: TEST OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BUBBLE MEASURES IN TWO TREATMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hassel R
2
 
Mann-Whitney U = 3.00 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
NPD 
Mann-Whitney U = 1.00 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
NAD 
Mann-Whitney U = 1.00 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
Velocity 
Mann-Whitney U = 1.00 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
Amplitude 
Mann-Whitney U = 1.00 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
RAD 
Mann-Whitney U = 2.00 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
RD 
Mann-Whitney U = 2.00 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
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E.II: SPEARMAN’S RHO CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN BIAS SCORES AND BUBBLE 
MEASURES 
 
 
 BStest BSforecasting 
Hassel R
2
 
-0.770 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
-0.673 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
NPD 
0.745 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
0.636 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
NAD 
0.745 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
0.636 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
Velocity 
0.717 
(p < 0.01, one-sided) 
0.550 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
Amplitude 
0.661 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
0.515 
(p < 0.1, one-sided) 
RAD 
0.636 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
0.661 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
RD 
0.636 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
0.661 
(p < 0.05, one-sided) 
